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Abstract 
        In February 2013, eleven Member States agreed to adopt the Commissions’ 
Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
financial transaction tax, COM (2013)71 final. This article reviews three thematic areas 
frequently discussed by practitioners and academia alike on the impact that the Proposal 
could have on companies operating within participating Member States. This includes 
the impact on capital and related costs, business strategy and compliance considerations. 
I ask the question whether the unintentional repercussions could be mitigated by making 
adjustments to the current Proposal including the expansion of exemptions and the 
adoption of an implementation framework that takes inspiration from the Value Added 
Tax System that is already implemented across Member States.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
Since 2008, the financial crisis has had a damaging effect on a number of economies 
around the globe. Much pressure has been placed on authorities to find a solution to the 
underlying causes of the financial crisis and take positive steps to avoid a repetition of the past. 
Although the financial sector carried much of the blame, there were many factors which 
contributed to the financial crisis.1 Many argue that the financial crisis was fuelled by excessive 
leverage and the property bubble.2 Others note the effect of executive compensation which 
encouraged risk taking, the lack of sufficient regulation and supervision3 and legislation that 
may have encouraged short term bias towards debt.4 Presently, we still find ourselves asking 
why questionable tax policy has not be abolished.5 Furthermore, the increase in lending credit, 
financial liberalisation, opacity and complexity may also have had a significant impact and are 
issues which require monitoring even today.6  
Whilst we find a number of individual country initiatives for improved regulation and 
fiscal reform, the European Union (EU) has pushed for a unified approach amongst Member 
States. The EU felt strongly that it should ‘lead efforts to set a global approach [...] with a view 
to maintaining a world-wide level playing field’.7 In 2010,8 after reviewing a number of 
alternative ways to potentially regulate the financial sector (see Section 1.2.), an overwhelming 
majority of Member States voted in favour of outlining a proposal for a financial transaction 
tax (FTT).9 
                                                 
1
 European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2010 on the financial, economic and social crisis: 
recommendations concerning measures and initiatives to be taken (mid-term report), 2009/2182(INI), 
P7_TA(2010)0376.  
2
 Hemmelgarn, T., & G. Nicodème (2010): ‘The 2008 Financial Crisis and Taxation Policy’. Taxation Papers. 
European Commission, Working Paper, 20. 
3
 G-20. The official communique issued at the close of the G20 London Summit. 2 April 2009. Available at: 
http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_8622_fr.htm 
4
 OECD Discussion Note (2011): ‘Promoting Longer-term investments by institutional investors: Selected issues 
and policies’. EUROFI High Level Seminar Organised with the French Presidency of the G20, Paris, 17-18 
February. 
5
 Alworth, J., & G. Arachi (2010): ‘Taxation and the Financial Crisis’. In European Tax Policy Form, Institute for 
Fiscal Studies Conference. 
6
 Claessens, S., & L. Kodres (2014): ‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some 
Uncomfortable Questions’. Research Department and Institute for Capacity Development, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/14/46. 
7
 European Council (2010): EUCO 13/10, Conclusions of 17 June 2010. General Secretariat of the Council. p 7. 
8
 European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on financial transaction taxes – making them work. 
P7_TA(2010)0056.  
9
 European Parliament resolution of 8 March 2011 on innovative financing at global and European level, 
2010/2105(INI), P7_TA(2011)0080. 
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Based on the polluter should pay principle,10 the first proposal for a financial transaction 
tax was presented in 2011,11 shortly after the G-20 Toronto summit held in 2010.12 Not all 
Member States agreed on the introduction of an EU-wide transaction tax on financial 
instruments.13 As conflicts persisted, this prompted a call for last resort measures14 which set 
in motion the procedure for enhanced cooperation amongst willing Member States.15,16 In 2013, 
the Council Directive for implementing enhanced cooperation binding participating Member 
States, was published,17 herein referred to as the Proposal. The Proposal has been called a 
‘milestone in global tax history’18 and brings together eleven participating Member States19 
that seek to adopt FTT through enhanced cooperation procedure.20,21 
The objectives of the Proposal focus on three core areas.22 Firstly, it seeks to prevent 
fragmentation of the single market that could arise form uncoordinated approaches amongst 
Member States to tax the financial sector. Secondly, the Proposal seeks to ensure that the 
financial sector makes a fair and substantial contribution to public finances. Thirdly, the 
Proposal aims to discourage market transactions that do not contribute to the efficiency of 
financial markets or to the real economy.  
The Proposal has found wide support from Oxfam,23 various non-governmental 
                                                 
10
 Dietlein, G. (2012). 
11
 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending 
Directive 2008/7/EC Brussels, 28.9.2011, COM(2011) 594 final. 
12
 The G-20 Toronto Summit concluded that that financial reform must ensure that the financial sector make a 
‘fair and substantial contribution towards paying for any burdens associated with government interventions’ See 
The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, Toronto, June 27, 2010. Available at: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-
communique.html. 
13
 Council of Europe, 3178th Council meeting Economic and Financial Affairs Luxembourg, Press Release 
1682/12. 22 June 2012.  
14
 Article 20(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
15
 European Parliament ‘Eleven EU countries get Parliament's all clear for a financial transaction tax’. Plenary 
Session Press release - Economic and monetary affairs, 12 February 2012.  
16
 The concept of enhanced cooperation was first introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 and was later 
simplified by the Treaty of Nice, 2001. In 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon helped to further improve cooperation 
between Member States. The legal basis for enhanced cooperation today is provided for both in Article 20 of the 
TEU and Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
17
 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial 
transaction tax, COM (2013) 71 final of February 14, 2013. 
18
 Šemeta, A. (2012): ‘The Financial Transactions Tax: Europe Needs It’. World Commerce Review. 
19Austria, Belgium, France, Estonia, Italy, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
20
 Commission Proposal for a Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of financial 
transaction tax Brussels, 25.10.2012 COM(2012) 631 final/2. 
21This is made possible since the minimum participation required by the TEU has been acceded. See Article 20(2), 
TEU. 
22
 The objectives were first outlined in the Commissions initial Proposal, COM(2011) 594 final. The general 
objectives for enhanced cooperation remained the same, See COM(2013) 71 final. 
23
 Oxfam International (2013): ‘Oxfam salutes European Parliament's vote of confidence for an ambitious 
Financial Transaction Tax’. 3 July. Available at: http://www.oxfam.org/en/eu/pressroom/reactions/oxfam-
salutes-european-parliaments-vote-confidence-ambitious-financial. 
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organizations,24 trade unions,25 academics26 and European citizens.27,28 While those in favour 
of the Proposal see FTT as a tax instrument that could help to stabilize markets and reduce the 
likelihood of future crises, opponents fear that it may lead to a loss in trade, employment and 
growth and negatively affect the financial sector.29 Banks and financial institutions have 
particularly voiced their concern that higher trading costs invoked by FTT may negatively 
affect their ability to compete internationally.30   
In the light of the Commission’s stand to encourage greater harmonisation on financial 
transaction taxes and prevent uncoordinated approaches within the European Union, it is 
interesting to note the number of Member States that do in fact charge transaction taxes on 
financial instruments. Table 1 shows that a total of twelve Member States do implement 
transaction taxes on financial instruments, of which only six are signatory to the enhanced 
cooperation agreement for FTT. This conflicts to some extent with their decision not to support 
the Proposal. There exists, however, a number of differences between transaction taxes found 
in Member States and the Proposal itself; in terms of scope, tax rate and design, which makes 
choosing FTT far from straightforward.31 The lack of harmonisation that is found within the 
European Union distorts the internal market and creates opportunities for tax arbitrage. These 
issues underpin the concerns of the Commission, and support the use FTT as a tax instrument 
in the most harmonised way possible. Although these facts gives impetus to a harmonised 
approach to FTT, and make us question if FTT could be prelude to a global tax,32 this is unlikely 
                                                 
24
 PSI signs on letter with recommendations to new World Bank president Re: Financial transaction taxes as a 
source of innovative finance, addressed to Dr. Jim Yong Kim President of the World Bank, October 05, 2012, 
Available at: http://www.world-psi.org/en/psi-signs-letter-recommendations-new-world-bank-president. 
25
 Henkow, O. (2012): ‘The Commission's Proposal for a Common System of Financial Transaction tax: A Legal 
Appraisal’. EC Tax Review 21/1, 5-16. 
26
 Open Letter In Support of Financial Transaction Taxes, Centre for Economic and Policy Research, to whom it 
may concern, 3 December 2009. Available at: http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/economists-
support-ftt/. 
27
 65% of EU citizens supported a tax on financial instruments. See European Commission (2011): ‘Public 
Opinion in the European Union, Europe’s Perception of the State of the Economy’. Standard Eurobarometer 75 / 
Spring – TNS opinion & social.  
28
 A survey carried out by Oxfam found that more than twice as many people supported FTT than those that 
opposed it in UK (51% vs 19%), Germany (53% v 24%), France (51% v 22%), Spain (67% v 15%) and Italy 
(59% v 18%). In the Netherlands 38% were in favour and 25% were opposed.  See Oxfam (2011): ‘YouGov poll 
for Oxfam in UK, Germany, France, Spain, Netherlands and Italy’. Undertaken 7th – 14th March 2011. 
29
 See House of Lords, EU Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, Financial Transaction Tax: an update 
evidence. Tuesday 19 March 2013. Available at:  http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-
com-a/FTTEnhancedScrutiny/FTTScrutinyupdatesEvidence.pdf. 
30
 AIMA Research Note (2002): ‘Financial Transaction Tax, An Assessment of the European Commission’s 
Proposed Financial Transaction Tax,’ Alternative Investment Management Association. 
31
 Current transaction taxes across Member States vary and reflects the individual Member States’ own particular 
fiscal policy and objectives. There are differences in terms of the treatment of transactions between groups, 
whether transaction taxes are charged in the case of mergers and acquisitions, and the scope of exemptions and 
deductions. Tax rates also vary.  
32
 European Commission. Proposal for a Council Regulation of 9 November 2011 on the methods and procedure 
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occur.33,34,35 The Proposal, however, could potentially have a positive domino effect on other 
countries which may be inspired by the Commission’s initiative. As more and more countries 
seek to introduce transaction taxes on financial instruments, for regulatory or revenue purposes, 
or both, they may feel justified in doing so on the back of the initiative taken by the 
Commission. The Proposal may therefore achieve its objective indirectly, even if in a 
piecemeal way.    
 
Table 1 –Transaction taxes on shares in EU Member States36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
for making available the own resource based on the financial transaction tax. COM (2011)738 final, 2011/0334 
(CNS).  
33
 Pomeranets, A. (2012): ‘Financial Transaction Taxes: International Experiences, Issues and Feasibility’. Bank 
of Canada Review, Autumn, 3-13. 
34
 AIMA Research Note (2012). 
35
 Meussen, G. (2011): ‘A New Tax Strategy for the European Union: FTT and FAT, Realistic or a Bridge too 
Far?’. 51 Eur. Taxn. 2/3 Journals IBFD. 
36
 Source: IBFD (2013): ‘European Tax Handbook.’ Global Tax Series, IBFD.  
* Capital duty may refer to both duty payable on formation as well as duty on the issuance of shares. It has been 
included here to highlight other taxes that may be due on the transfer of financial instruments. 
↑ Participating Member States to enhanced cooperation agreement. 
Member State Transaction Tax Capital Duty* 
Austria↑ - √ 
Belgium↑ √ - 
Bulgaria - - 
Croatia - - 
Cyprus √ √ 
Czech Republic - - 
Denmark - - 
Estonia↑ - - 
Finland √ - 
France↑ √ √ 
Germany↑ - - 
Greece↑ √ √ 
Hungary - - 
Ireland √ - 
Italy↑ √ - 
Latvia - - 
Lithuania - - 
Luxembourg - - 
Malta √ √ 
Netherlands - - 
Poland √ √ 
Portugal↑ √ - 
Romania - - 
Slovakia↑ - - 
Slovenia↑ - - 
Spain↑ √ √ 
Sweden - - 
United Kingdom √ - 
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1.2. Alternatives to Financial Transaction Tax 
The Commission has undertaken a number of discussions on how best to tax the 
financial sector. Discussions focused on selecting the appropriate tax instrument that could 
generate sufficient revenues and provide the appropriate steering effects. Such an instrument 
would need to focus on ‘value added’, be ‘non-distortive’, yet still meet ‘equity objectives’.37 
A number of alternatives were discussed including Financial Activity Tax (FAT), Financial 
Stability Contribution (FSC) and Value Added Taxation (VAT).38 Each alternative tax 
instrument is discussed hereunder, in the light of the Commission’s choice to continue with 
FTT as its preferred means to tax the financial sector, which is discussed in detail in Section 
1.3. 
FAT is a form of bank levy which is charged on ‘the sum of the profits of financial 
institutions and the remuneration paid by them’.39 The IMF40 proposed three variants of FAT, 
– FAT 1 based on a VAT like system without the right to deduct wages, FAT 2 which taxes 
financial sector rents and FAT 3 based on risk taking.41 Like FTT, FAT is Pigovian in nature 
and seeks to curb excess42 and does so by increasing costs proportionately. This, however, 
arises independently of the source of revenue generation.43 As a result, FAT is criticized for 
not having the appropriate steering effects44 as it is unable to ‘reorient market trading 
behaviour’.45 Some argue that FAT could be modified to make it more appropriate as a tax 
instrument for regulating the financial sector.46 Although a risk taking FAT could tackle risk,47 
measures that are more ‘closely linked to the sources of systemic risk might be more 
                                                 
37
 Claessens, S., M. Keen, & C. Pazarbasioglu, eds. (2010) p. 20. 
38
 Other alternatives include securities transaction taxes (STT) and global solidarity levy. 
39
 Staff of the International Monetary Fund (2010): ‘A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector 
– Final Report for the G-20’. IMF. p. 5. 
40
 In its report, the IMF outlines three alternative versions of the FAT, namely (i) the addition-method FAT, (ii) 
the rent-taxing FAT and (iii) the risk-taxing FAT. The report states that whereas the addition method taxes all 
profits and remuneration, the rent-taxing method taxes profit only above a certain amount, calculated based on 
the application for an allowance for corporate equity. Risk-taxing FAT is a step above rent-taxing FAT and focuses 
on excessive return. Staff of the International Monetary Fund (2010). 
41
 See Shaviro, D. N. (2012): ‘The Financial Transactions Tax vs. The Financial Activities Tax’. Tax Analysts, 
Special Report, 453-474, for an in-depth analysis of all three proposals made by the IMF. 
42
 Some argue that the lack of specificity in FTT makes the latter fall short of being Pigovian in nature. See 
Kaiding, J. (2014): ‘The Financial Transaction Tax: The Way Forward for the European Union?’. EC Tax Review, 
1, 30-42.  
43
 COM(2010) 549 final. 
44
 Kavelaars, P. (2012): ‘Bank Taxes in Forms and Sizes: EC Opts for FTT’. Intertax 40, 6/7, 400-407. p. 404. 
45
 Buckley, R., & G. North (2011): ‘A Financial Transactions Tax: Inefficient or Needed Systemic Reform?’ 
University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 2011. Working Paper 56.  
46
 Shaviro, D. N. (2012). 
47
 Commission Staff Working Paper of 28 September 2011, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 
2008/7/EC Vol. 1, SEC(2011) 1102 final. 
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appropriate’.48 In this way it can help to deter speculation, noise trading, as well as technical 
trading and also reduce markets volatility.49 FAT, however, lacks specificity in its focus on 
speculative trading, a key issue in the debate on the introduction of FTT.50 FTT seems to 
provide more focus in this respect as it focuses primarily on financial instruments (see Section 
1.3.), even if this objective may be difficult to achieve in practice (see Section 2.2.3.) 
Estimates show51 that FAT could generate approximately €25 billion in tax revenues 
within the 27 EU Member States,52 far less than the €31 billon53 that could potentially be 
generated by FTT under enhanced cooperation. However, an advantage of FAT over FTT is 
that the former is easier to implement54 and potentially more efficient.55 Global harmonisation 
in all cases would reduce distortions.56 But while FTT is criticized that it may lead to relocation 
of financial institutions (see Section 2.2.2.), FAT may encourage profit shifting as a means to 
reduce the tax burden without relocation taking place.57 GDP will therefore be negatively 
affected in both cases.58 
FAT and FTT were not the only measures considered by the Commission as alternatives 
to regulate the financial sector. Other considerations included FSC which focuses on a 
company’s balance sheet and is linked to a ‘credible and effective resolution mechanism’.59 In 
contrast to FTT, it reflects a levy on banks, focusing on the institution rather than on the 
financial instrument being traded. In this respect FSC is similar to FAT. The IMF in fact 
proposed that FSC be introduced alongside FAT.60 FSC, if appropriately designed does 
however provides an advantage for policy makers over FAT. It can provide greater focus on 
key issues that need to address as part and parcel of tax reform in a post financial crisis 
                                                 
48
 Commission Staff Working Paper Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 
2008/7/EC, SEC(2011) 1103 final. p. 5. 
49
 SEC(2011) 1103 final. 
50
 In practice it may be difficult to limit FTT to trading which is purely of a speculative nature.  
51
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Regions, Taxation of the Financial Sector, Brussels, 7.10.2010 COM(2010) 549 final. 
52
 Commission estimates based on IMF report See Claessens S., M. Keen, & C. Pazarbasioglu (2010): ‘Financial 
Sector Taxation, The IMF’s Report to the G-20 and Background Material’. IMF. 
53
 Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2013) 71 final. 
54
 Leading Group (2010): ‘Globalising Solidarity: The Case for Financial Levies’. Report of the Committee of 
Experts to the Taskforce on International Financial Transactions and Development. Leading Group on Innovating 
Financing for Development. Paris. 
55
 Vella, J. (2012): ‘The Financial Transaction Tax Debate: Some Questionable Claims’. In The Financial 
Transaction Tax – Boon or Bane? Intereconomics, 2012/2, 90-95. 
56
 Soone, A. (2014): ‘Some Legal Issues with Implementing Commission Proposed Financial Transaction Tax in 
Estonia’. Intertax, 42/1, 44–50. 
57
 COM(2010) 549 final. 
58
 Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2011) 594 final. 
59
 Staff of the International Monetary Fund (2010), p. 25. 
60
 Staff of the International Monetary Fund (2010). 
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environment. Through the incorporation of provisions within FSC that increase the tax burden 
on banks in relation to risk, FSC can target specific actors operating in the financial sector. 
Consideration of risk would include a review of the size of the institution, interconnectedness 
between institutions and the substitutability of each.61 Focusing on these issues are important 
given the events that took place during the early period of the financial crisis where we saw the 
failure of a number of major financial institutions including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the 
Lehman Brothers. The collapse of these important financial institutions resonated throughout 
the financial world as regulators allowed banks to become too large, and to increase their 
interdependence to excessive levels. 
FSC specifically aims to ensure that the sector makes a contribution to resolution fund 
and reduce systematic risk.62 In line with this objective, FSC may accordingly be introduced 
either in a permanent or temporary manner. The impact of FSC will ultimately depend on the 
size of the tax base, but could potentially amount to 2% of GDP in some countries.63 
The Commission has chosen not to make VAT on financial services offered by the 
financial sector mandatory and, as a result, most Member States opt to exempt64 most, or all, 
services offered by the sector. This provides financial institutions with a distinct advantage, 
including lower tax costs and cost savings with respect to administration and compliance. The 
exemption status of many financial institutions has led to claims that the sector, as a whole, is 
undertaxed.65,66,67,68,69,70 The potential for revenue generation is substantial, even if deductions 
for VAT on inputs are taken into consideration.71 Some argue that it would be technically 
difficult to charge VAT on financial services.72 Technical issues, however, could be 
overcome.73 The framework that already exists within the EU for administration and 
                                                 
61
 Staff of the International Monetary Fund (2010). 
62
 Staff of the International Monetary Fund (2010).  
63
 Staff of the International Monetary Fund (2010). 
64
 Article 135(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of VAT. 
65
 COM(2011) 594 final. 
66
 De la Feria, R., & R. Krever (2013): ‘Ending VAT Exemptions: Towards A Post-Modern VAT’. Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation, Said Business School, Oxford, WP12/28. 
67
 Hernández González-Barreda, P.A. (2013): ‘On the European Way to a Financial Transaction Tax under 
Enhanced Cooperation: Multi-speed Europe or Shortcut?’. Intertax 41/4, 208-229. 
68
 Kavelaars, P. (2012). 
69
 Henkow, O. (2012). 
70
 Hein, R. (2012): ‘The Financial Transaction Tax: Where’s Robin Hood’. IBFD, Derivatives and Financial 
Instruments, 14/1, 122-24. 
71
 Contrary to claims of under taxation, the lack of input deductions could lead to over taxation and a high tax 
burden for the sector. See Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 
2008/7/EC Vol. 6. Brussels, 28.9.2011. SEC(2011) 1102 final.  
72
 Hernández González-Barreda, P.A. (2013). 
73
 SEC(2011) 1102 final, Vol. 1. 
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compliance of VAT is an advantage that this tax instrument has over FAT, FSC and FTT. 
Furthermore, the application of VAT principles which exempts most transactions undertaken 
with persons in third countries, would also help to overcome the criticism levied against FTTs’ 
extraterritorial effect (see Section 1.5.). Even though the potential for revenue generation under 
VAT might be quite substantial, full adoption of VAT is not, however, always convincing. 
VAT may not be able to address the speculative nature of the transactions, which discourages 
changes to the present treatment of the financial sector. It is this lack of focus which makes 
VAT not the preferred means to tax the financial sector, and places FTT in a more preferential 
light. There are, however, some aspects that could inspire changes to the Proposal and provide 
a support framework for implementation that should not be overlooked. These issues are 
discussed further in Section 3.  
In the alternatives discussed above, the main point of each tax instrument is to ensure 
that the financial sector makes a contribution towards tax revenues in a way which discourages 
distortive activities and provides revenue sources for authorities. Unfortunately the incidence 
is always likely to be passed on to end consumer in one way or another (see Section 1.4.). 
Empirical research on tax incidence to identify which alternative would give rise to the least 
incidence of shifting is not available. The tax base for each tax instrument may help shed light 
on this issue,74 but must still be considered within the perspective of elasticities of demand and 
supply. Ultimately the tax instrument selected must be fit for purpose.75 Within the objectives 
outlined by the Commission itself in 2010, focusing on reducing volatility, increasing revenue 
generation and fairness,76 the Commission has chosen to pursue FTT. 
 
1.3. The European Unions’ Proposal for Financial Transaction Tax 
Article 113 and 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)77 
provides the legal basis for the introduction of FTT through enhanced cooperation procedure 
amongst participating Member States. The Proposal is based on the theories of John Keynes78 
                                                 
74
 FTT is cumulative and causes a cascading effect. VAT is charged on net values but is ultimately paid by the 
end user. FSC and FAT are paid by banks. Banks may shift costs to end customers by charging higher fees for 
services.  
75
 Shaviro, D. N. (2012). 
76
 The Commission noted that the choice of a tax instrument had to fulfil three main criteria. Firstly, had to enhance 
the efficiency and stability of financial markets and reducing their volatility. Secondly, it had to contribute to 
fiscal consolidation and auxiliary resources as well as economic efficiency. Thirdly, as most financial services are 
VAT exempt, any instrument selected would need to make a fairer and more substantial contribution to 
government finances. See COM(2010) 549 final. 
77
 Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012     
2012/C 326/01. 
78
 Keynes, J. (1936): ‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money’. Harcourt Brace and Company. 
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and Nobel Prize laureate James Tobin.79 Both suggested that transaction taxes could be used 
to discourage harmful trading with Keynes emphasising the need for markets to refocus on 
fundamental values while Tobin emphasised the need for transaction taxes to remove the 
distortive effect of volatility. By throwing ‘sand in the wheels’80 of market trading, a 
proportionate tax on gross values would discourage excessive trading and reduce market 
volatility. By taxing each transaction, the Proposal identifies with the theoretical objectives of 
Keynes and Tobin by discouraging transactions that do not enhance market efficiency. 
The Commission’s Proposal, COM(2013) 71 final, is broad in scope and covers ‘all 
actors, instruments and markets’.81 Financial institutions are subject to FTT if they are 
established in a participating Member State82 and are considered established if they have 
authorisation, a registered seat, a permanent address or have a branch in a participating Member 
State.83 Financial institutions located in third countries are also subject to FTT through the 
principle of deemed establishment84 (see Section 1.5.). 
Secondly, all instruments are subject to FTT which is charged on gross values, before 
netting and settlement.85 Transactions subject to FTT include all purchases and sales, transfers 
between groups, conclusions of derivative contracts and exchange and repurchase 
agreements.86 The rate of tax is 0.01% on derivative contracts and 0.1% on other financial 
instruments.87 The Proposal does not solely focus on speculative trading,88 which contrasts to 
some extent with the objectives of the Proposal (see Section 1.1.) as all trades, whether 
distortive or otherwise, will be subject to FTT. The rates established within the Proposal are 
minimum rates; as a result, Member States are free to set higher tax rates of tax.89 FTT is 
                                                 
79
 Tobin, J. (1974): ‘The New Economics One Decade Older’. The Eliot Janeway lectures on historical economics 
in honour of Joseph Schumpeter, 1972. Princeton, N.J  
80
 Although Tobin used the reference with respect to money markets, it is equally applicable to transactions 
undertaken within the wider context of financial markets, which were the focus of Keynes proposal for a general 
financial transaction tax. See Tobin, J. (1978): ‘A Proposal for International Monetary Reform’. Eastern Economic 
Journal 4, 153–159. 
81
 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council 
Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax Analysis of policy options 
and impacts Brussels, 14.2.2013, SWD(2013) 28 final.  
82
 Article 4(1), COM (2013) 71 final. 
83
 Article 4(1)(a) to (e), COM(2013) 71 final. 
84
 Article 4(1)(f) and (g), COM(2013) 71 final. 
85
 Article 9, COM(2013) 71 final. 
86
 Article 2(2), COM (2013) 71 final. The definition of taxable financial instruments makes reference to section 
C of Annex 1 of the MIFID Directive 2004/39/EC and includes structured products. See Article 2(3), COM(2013) 
71 final.  
87
 Article 9, COM(2013) 71 final. 
88
 Other countries such as France and Italy make a distinction based on the type of trading undertaken which may 
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charged on both legs of a transaction, which doubles the effective rates of tax outlined within 
the Proposal. In the case of transactions other than derivatives, the taxable amount of FTT is 
based on consideration paid,90 whilst transactions carried out between entities in a group are 
subject to market price considerations.91 The taxable amount for derivatives is the notional 
amount referred to in the derivative contracts.92 In all cases, tax is charged at the moment the 
transaction occurs.93 
Financial instruments issued within a participating Member State are subject to FTT, 
regardless of the place where the transaction is undertaken.94 The combination of residence and 
issuance principles gives FTT an extraterritorial effect, which means that there are limited 
circumstances where FTT would not apply (see Section 1.6.). Economic substance provisions 
are considered within the Proposal,95 which removes tax liability if no economic link to a 
participating Member State is found. But guidance on this issue is limited even if it remains a 
crucial provision to moderate the excessive territorial effects of FTT.96 
Thirdly, all markets are subject to FTT. This is due not only to the combination of 
factors outlined above, but also to the limited exemptions found within the Proposal. Exempt 
transactions include primary market transactions, transactions with central banks, the European 
Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism.97 Also excluded are every 
day transactions such as ‘the conclusion of insurance contracts, mortgage lending, consumer 
credits, enterprise loans and payment services currency transactions on spot markets’.98 
Exemptions outlined within the Proposal, however, do not take into consideration the different 
legal characteristics of financial products, which may be structured differently in each Member 
State. 
The Proposal complies in full with the Capital Duty Directive.99 Furthermore, it does 
not hinder the rights of authorities within the EU from raising capital. Restructuring of 
operations are also exempt,100 but surprisingly, the cancellation or rectification of financial 
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instruments are still subject to FTT.101 The latter is decisively at odds with the design of tax 
instruments in general. Such provisions mean that the Proposal makes a number of assumptions 
on transactions carried out in the financial sector. It assumes to some degree that all trades are 
pursued to completion, and if they are not, this reflects an intention to avoid tax payment, which 
may not be the case. Only errors are excluded from being subject to FTT.102 The wide net of 
the Proposal in this respect does act as an important tool against speculative trading by 
discouraging spoofing,103 which causes volatility in market. 
Implementation and administration of the Proposal rests with individual Member 
States.104 Little guidance however is provided in this regard which may cause implementation 
problems. The Proposal does, however, highlight that payment must be made within three 
working days, or immediately in the case of transactions undertaken electronically.105 It further 
adds that participating Member States should adopt measures that prevent fraud and evasion 
within their jurisdiction.106 The Proposal also includes general anti-avoidance provisions,107 
which are similar to provisions outlined in the Commission Recommendation on aggressive 
tax planning.108 This broad general guidance on how FTT is to be administered by Member 
States may give rise to implementation problems. Additionally, national measures may conflict 
where cross border transactions are subject to different requirements and no common 
framework for resolution is found.  
Another aspect incorporated within the Proposal, which is not generally found in the 
other tax instruments, is the concept of joint and several liability.109 The inclusion of this 
provisions in the Proposal means that if any party to the transaction does not pay the amount 
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of FTT due on their leg of a transaction, the other party shall be liable on his behalf. This could 
potentially expose companies located in participating Member States to uncertainty and higher 
costs as authorities can more easily access payment on domestic taxpayers, than on those 
resident abroad. Within all EU Member States, enforcement is supported by a number of 
existing agreements110 but such agreements are unlikely to be in place with all third countries. 
Joint and several liability may be more burdensome where enforcement agreements with third 
countries are lacking.111 It is, however, reasonable to assume that financial institutions are 
likely to consider the reputation of counterparties112 before undertaking transactions in such 
situations, and consider this within their risk profiling before entering into any transaction. 
 
1.4. Incidence of Transaction Taxes 
A primary objective of the Proposal is to ensure that the financial sector makes a ‘fair’ 
and ‘substantial’ contribution towards covering the costs of the financial crisis.113 Liability for 
FTT should fall on financial institutions114 but there is growing support that the incidence of 
FTT may in fact be shifted onto end consumers of financial services.115,116,117 Users of financial 
instruments may find that they are charged higher transaction costs or higher administrative 
fees as financial institutions pass on their additional tax burden (from FTT) to them.  
The issue of tax incidence depends on a number of factors. It will depend on elasticity 
of demand and supply for financial instruments, as well as the reaction of competitors in other 
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markets.118 It will also depend on the availability of domestic substitutes and investors attitudes 
towards investing abroad. Trading costs to enter foreign markets, particularly fixed costs, could 
sustain home bias.119 The Mirrlees Report120 on tax design noted that the incidence of taxation 
will in due course always fall on the owners (shareholders), customers or employees of any 
company subject to taxation. This may prove positive if we consider that wealthy individuals 
may hold a larger proportion of financial instruments than individuals in low and middle 
income groups.121,122,123 The taxation of financial instruments could in this case be considered 
as progressive in nature if, in fact, the ownership and thus incidence of the tax did fall mainly 
on wealthy individuals.124,125 Others, however, query whether taxes on financial transactions 
could have an opposite effect. If taxes cause a barrier for individuals to enter financial markets, 
they not only lose the benefits of diversification but may also expose themselves to higher risks 
associated with the holding of cash. This would prove regressive in nature for individuals and 
thus have an opposite effect to what would be considered as a fair outcome of FTT.126 
 
1.5. The (Extra)Territorial Effect of Financial Transaction Tax 
The Proposal incorporates a number of important provisions to ensure that FTT, when 
implemented, is paid by all parties to a financial transaction. This is achieved through the 
extraterritorial effect of FTT that is derived from the application of both the principles of 
deemed establishment and issuance (see Section 1.3.). Briefly, the extraterritorial effect of FTT 
arises in the following manner. Firstly, a party to a financial transaction that is located outside 
a participating Member States is subject to FTT if the financial instrument that it is trading in 
was issued in a participating Member State (issuance principle).127 Secondly, financial 
institutions located in a third country are also subject to FTTs’ extraterritorial effect when they 
undertake any transaction with a financial institution established within a participating Member 
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State. By this act, they are deemed to be established in the jurisdiction of that counterparty.128 
This is known as the counterparty principle.129 The counterparty principle and issuance 
principle together ensure that FTT is always paid on both legs of a transaction regardless of the 
location of the trading parties. It, however, makes us question if this may conflict with the 
principles of international public law. 
International public law provides that jurisdiction to tax is based on the principles of 
residence and/or source based rules. These principles of taxation are based on a link or nexus 
(residence or source) existing between the taxpayer and the taxing jurisdiction. Conflicts arise 
with the application of FTT as counterparties to a financial transaction, who are not located in 
a participating Member State, are still subject to FTT. Such companies would in most 
circumstances be generally considered as only trading with the jurisdiction and not trading in 
the jurisdiction, and hence would not generally be subject to tax. 
The Commission, in 2013, sought to clarify this issue by stating that a financial 
institution that trades with a counterparty located within a participating Member State is 
‘contributing to the achievement of a legally relevant result within that jurisdiction’.130 In this 
way, a sufficient nexus with the jurisdiction is created, and therefore, according to the 
Commission, no conflict arises with international public law.131 Furthermore, the Commission 
added that the rights of non-participating Member States to remain outside the enhanced 
cooperation zone are not compromised by the extraterritorial effect of FTT. Any double 
taxation that may arise is purely international double taxation. The latter, it argued, arises in 
many other cases too, and therefore, if it arises within the context of FTT, this is simply a 
reflection of what happens elsewhere. This therefore cannot be used as an indication of 
discrimination against any party as each Member State is free to continue with their own 
transaction taxes. According to the Commission, Article 327 is therefore safeguarded. 
Moreover, it adds that any cross border issues that arise cannot be considered as a hindrance to 
free movement of capital otherwise every tax on cross border trade would be considered as an 
obstacle. The apparent incompatibility of FTT with international or European law was also 
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addressed by the EU Commission's Director for indirect taxation. In 2014, Mr Bergmann132 
stated that ‘sufficient connection’ with participating Member States arises where either the ‘the 
seller's residence, the buyer's residence, the place of the transaction and the place of issue of 
the product traded’ arises within a participatory Member State.133 He rejects that FTT could 
conflict with international law on allocation of taxing rights, referring to the fact that if a 
general rule did exist and jurisdictions applied this around the globe, then the issue of double 
taxation would never arise.  
This contrasts sharply with the opinion expressed by the Legal Services of the European 
Commission. The latter expressed its concern that FTT does in fact create conflict. In particular, 
the Legal Services highlighted that the extraterritorial effect of FTT does not tally with the 
position of the Commission in regards to the Helms-Burton legislation,134 nor could the 
exceptions in Wood Pulp135 be applied. It further notes that the extraterritoriality effect of FTT 
cannot be justified on the basis of revenue generation, contributions to the financial crisis, the 
need to discourage risk taking, or the need to have in place measures to avoid evasion or fraud, 
or potential relocation to non-participating countries.136 Furthermore, the difference in 
treatment between participating and non-participating Member States, which gives rise to 
higher opportunities for enforcement of joint and several liability within participating Member 
States, could impact free movement of capital. It holds the opinion that FTT could also impede 
the right of non-participating Member States to remain outside the enhanced cooperation zone, 
as financial institutions within their Member State will still be required to pay FTT. The Legal 
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Services concludes that FTT not only exceeds Member States' ‘jurisdiction for taxation under 
the norms of international customary law’, but furthermore, ‘infringes the tax competences’ of 
non-participating Member States under Article 327 TFEU and is also ‘discriminatory’ and 
‘distortionary’ to the detriment of non-participating Member States.137 
The need for FTT to have an extraterritorial effect must be balanced with the need to 
reduce the likelihood of tax avoidance. Like trading parties, they will consider the cost of doing 
business after the introduction of a new tax, and will look for ways how best to reduce their 
costs. Foreign direct investment to the participating Member States will be affected if traders 
opt to stay away.  
Although subject to much criticism, the extraterritorial effect of FTT is also found in 
other taxes. A case in point is controlled foreign corporation (CFC) legislation. CFC legislation 
extends a country’s taxing right where no distributions have been made by a foreign subsidiary 
to a resident shareholder. The extension of a country’s taxing right to tax profits which have as 
yet not been distributed, is a significant anti-avoidance provision and is applied in a number of 
Member States, including the UK which is opposed to FTT.138 The UK has unsuccessfully 
challenged the Commission’s right for FTT to incorporate an extraterritorial effect.139 Stamp 
duty legislation in the UK incorporates an extraterritorial effect through the application of the 
issuance principle.  
The EU’s proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) also 
incorporates extraterritorial elements. Due to the proposed method of apportionment of income 
under the CCCTB system, income allocation between companies in a group is determined on 
the basis of a formulary apportionment approach. If CCCTB were to be adopted, Member 
States would be granted a right to tax income allocated to companies located within their 
jurisdiction, even though that income may not necessarily be linked to that State. Although this 
legislation is still to be enacted, one legislation which is in force today and which incorporates 
an extraterritorial effect is the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). FACTA 
specifically focuses on the financial services sector. Through the exchange of information 
agreements140 signed under FACTA, the United States is provided with information regarding 
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investments made by its residents with non-US financial institutions. Although similar to 
exchange of information agreements found under tax treaty provisions, it places a direct burden 
on financial institutions to provide information automatically. These financial institutions are 
subject to penalties if information is not provided. While no financial reimbursement for 
compliance costs incurred by financial institutions is provided for under FACTA, authorities 
may marginally benefit from reciprocity in information exchange provisions incorporated 
within agreements signed.  
This paper contributes to existing literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it highlights 
how FTT could impact companies operating within participating Member States. Secondly, the 
paper outlines key points that need to be considered to revamp the Proposal to reduce the 
distortive effect within the enhanced cooperation zone for FTT and to encourage adoption by 
non-participating Member States. This paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
Proposal under three key thematic areas. Section 3 discusses how the Proposal could be 
revamped. Section 4 concludes this paper. 
 
2. Impact of Financial Transaction Taxes 
 
2.1. Capital 
 
2.1.1. Transaction Cost and Cost of Capital Implications 
Transaction costs typically include brokerage fees, administrative fees, commissions 
and transaction taxes. The introduction of FTT increases the cost of capital141,142,143,144 as 
financial instruments are subject to higher transaction costs. The significance of this 
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issue145,146,147 is heightened by the important role that an efficient capital market plays within 
an economy, and how FTT could affect financial markets within participating Member States. 
Indirectly, the extraterritorial effect of FTT will also affect financial markets in non-
participating Member States if financial institutions continue to trade with counterparties 
located within the enhanced cooperation zone. The EU is, after all, home to some of the largest 
financial centres in the world, including the stock markets of London and Frankfurt. 
As transaction costs increase, rational investors will seek compensatory returns148,149 if 
the cost of debt (risk free rate plus credit risk rate x (1 – rate of tax)) or equity (risk free rate of 
return + premium) increase.150 Investors may either purchase shares at lower prices or seek 
higher dividends to compensate for the higher cost of trading. Some investors may simply 
decide to refrain from trading and avoid the extra cost,151 but if investors do move away from 
financial markets to avoid FTT, they forgo both the benefits of market knowledge152 and 
services (liquidity, risk assumption, price stability and matching buyers and sellers).153 
Furthermore, FTT could lead to portfolio distortions if decisions are overly influenced by 
taxation.154 
Ultimately, it is the number of trades which determines the extent to which FTT will 
affect the cost of capital.155 Long-term holdings would help to ‘dampen’ higher costs,156 but 
the impetus for long-term holdings is questionable. As noted above, investors may simply seek 
compensatory returns rather than focus on scaling down turnover.157 Furthermore, the issues 
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discussed here are not limited to the private sector. Governments too utilise financial markets 
to access finance.158 The cost of the financial crisis has already strained government revenues, 
but FTT could also increase the borrowing costs of authorities as they access financial markets 
to borrow from the private sector.  
 
2.1.2. Debt vs. Equity Financing 
A tax on financial instruments would affect both debt and equity. According to the 
pecking order theory of finance,159 the least costly source of finance are retained earnings,160 
followed by debt and then equity, in that order. This order may become distorted by the 
preferential tax treatment of debt.161 Even without the pecking order theory, if investors or 
firms have a particular preference, the tax system should not bias their choice. Within the 
context of the Proposal, the differential rate of taxation between derivatives and non-derivative 
products may also give rise to further bias, whilst investors may also favour primary listings 
and government debt which are also exempt from FTT. The bias that may arise towards 
government treasury bills and bonds may not always be preferential.162 Progressive 
implementation of FTT that has been recently proposed by some Member States, which favours 
staggering the introduction of FTT on derivative products, would also cause bias.163 This may 
arise in any case under the current Proposal if derivatives are used as substitute for non-
derivative transactions, which may not necessarily trigger current anti-avoidance provisions.  
The effect of FTT on debt and equity financing is also amplified by the size of a 
company. When seeking to raise finance, larger firms may be affected more by FTT than 
smaller firms that are generally ‘restricted to the loan market’.164 Furthermore, FTT also affects 
working capital requirements of companies subject to FTT, and due consideration needs to be 
taken in this regard.165 
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2.1.3. Employment 
Pomeranets states that increasing capital costs would negatively affect the ‘flow of 
profitable projects, [...] real production, expansion, capital investments and even 
employment’.166 If the financial sector is negatively affected by FTT, it may have no option 
but to reduce its workforce. A brain drain of well educated, talented individuals from 
participating Member States to competitive markets will have long-run repercussions for the 
financial institutions located in the former Member States. Competitors may significantly 
benefit from a knowledgeable workforce that has an intimate understanding of domestic 
markets and legislation. The United Kingdom could, for instance, lose up to 25% of its 
workforce under the current Proposal,167 with the rest of Europe also suffering significant job 
losses if the Proposal were to be introduced.168 Wage levels may also be affected169 as financial 
institutions try to cut expenses to compensate for the higher cost of doing business in an FTT 
environment. 
Some have argued that any downsizing of the workforce could simply help to rebalance 
the allocation of labour within an economy. Well before the financial crisis even started, there 
was a view amongst some academics that the financial sector already contained excess labour 
resources.170 As employment in the sector grew, productive real activities suffered.171 Diverting 
human capital away from the financial markets back towards ‘real’ activities could prove 
beneficial to the overall economic growth of a country and help to counter balance the negative 
effects of FTT. 
 
2.1.4. Asset Values 
Both theory and empirical results shows that transaction taxes reduce after-tax asset 
values.172,173,174,175,176 The empirical results (see Table 2) highlight that the effect on asset prices 
is consistent over time and in different markets. The discounting of future returns results in 
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lower net present value and hence, lower share prices. This downward pressure on asset values 
increases the cost of raising capital for a company.177 The permanent effect will be influenced 
by the rate of turnover and dividend yield of financial instruments.178 If the Proposal is adopted, 
it will have an impact on both.  
 
Table 2– Market Prices and Transaction Taxes 
Study Market  Period  Result 
Bond, Hawkins and 
Klemm (2005)179 
United Kingdom 1984, 1986, 1990 Reductions in stamp duty had a 
positive and significant effect 
on the price of more frequently 
traded shares compared to less 
frequently traded shares 
Westerholm (2003)180 Sweden  1983, 1986, 1991, 
1992 
Increase in asset prices due to 
reduction in transaction taxes 
Lui (2007)181 Japan 1989 Tax reduction led to decline in 
prices 
Hu (1998)182  14 changes in transaction 
taxes in 4 markets: Hong 
Kong, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan  
1975 - 1994 Increase in transaction tax 
reduced stock prices 
Umlauf (1993)183 Sweden 1980–87 Increase in transaction tax 
reduced stock prices 
 
2.2. Business Strategy 
 
2.2.1. Investment Strategy 
The growth of financial markets in recent years has outperformed the expansion in 
economic growth.184 Accompanying this growth we find a progressive shift away from 
fundamental values.185 This shift away from fundamental values of investments is particularly 
noticeable with respect to the effect that high-frequency trading has had on financial markets.186 
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Transaction taxes could help refocus investments,187 encouraging greater emphasis on the 
fundamental values of investments and improving market efficiency.188 Such changes would 
be in line with the theoretical basis of why transaction taxes were first proposed.189 As 
companies reassess their investment strategies within an FTT environment, they may shift their 
focus to investments having longer periods of time,190 but it is not clear if this too would 
encourage a greater focus on fundamental values.191 If FTT does encourage longer term 
holdings,192 this may in turn free up management to look beyond the short term.193,194 In an 
FTT environment, frequent short-term trades negatively affect investment returns, and this 
places pressure on managers to adjust their investment strategies to reduce the cost of FTT.195 
This would affect both real and financial investments, as greater focus is placed on productive 
uses of resources by managers.196,197,198 This, however, assumes that long-term planning time 
horizons are ignored, which may not be the case. A push to alter investment strategies will 
differ between companies as well as industries. Ultimately, ‘genuine long-term expectation 
[may be] so difficult’,199 that it may not be practical for investors.  
 
2.2.2. Relocation and Risk 
Given the highly mobile nature of financial transactions, the Proposal seeks to reduce 
substitution and relocation by being broad in scope.200 The Commission does, however, accept 
that relocation will nevertheless take place.201 Financial institutions that seek to avoid paying 
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FTT completely would have to abandon all ties with participating Member States – including 
removing all trading links (residence principle), forgoing all clients located in the enhanced 
cooperation zone (extraterritorial effect) and ceasing to trade in any financial instruments 
issued in a participating Member State (issuance principle). Relocation is subject to 
uncertainty,202 as well as costs,203 including the cost of repatriation of funds in terms of 
periodical dividend payments and / or capital during or at the end of the investment period. 
Furthermore, relocation could expose companies to systematic risk if investors are attracted to 
the same markets,204 due to preferential treatment of certain instruments. Companies, therefore, 
need to take into consideration both the cost of relocation and the potential returns from foreign 
investment.  
The advantages that FTT may give to non-participating Member States are still unclear. 
We may, however, see a shift in capital to these jurisdictions205 as investors favour the domestic 
European market over foreign jurisdictions,206 especially if domestic substitutes are 
available.207 This helps to keep capital within Europe. Other factors that need to be considered 
include technical limitations that limit relocation to offshore jurisdictions.208 A case in point is 
high frequency trading which requires the support of dedicated IT infrastructure. Moreover, 
investors do not always look for jurisdictions with the lowest cost.209 The extent of migration 
to non-participating Member States or third countries will depend on elasticity of supply and 
demand for financial instruments. Trading elasticities do vary across market segments,210 but 
are still likely to be on the high side.211 But exactly how markets will react may be difficult to 
gauge. There is a level of uncertainty even in the estimates put forward by the Commission 
itself.212 
FTT may also encourage groups to relocate certain specific activities outside the 
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enhanced zone. This may apply partially to subsidiaries acting as group financier213 where their 
presence becomes uneconomical.214 A judgement call for splitting the treasury function 
between avoidable and non-avoidable presence within participating Member States might be 
required. The EU could try to stem the loss of business by adopting ring-fencing provisions. 
Such provisions would not stray from the objective of the Proposal, as intra-group transactions 
are generally not speculative in nature.215 
 
2.2.3. Speculation: A Necessary Evil? 
The Proposal aims to curb speculation and stabilize financial markets. This follows the 
theories of Keynes216 and Tobin217 that transaction taxes improve market stability. Their 
theories are supported by academics such as Stiglitz218 and Summers and Summers,219 who 
also view transaction taxes as a way to reduce speculative trading. However, empirical research 
does not always support this position. Although FTT is likely to be effective in reducing 
automated high-frequency trading and highly leveraged derivatives,220 its overall effect on 
speculation is not entirely clear. As shown in Table 3, the impact that transaction taxes have 
had on market volatility varies, with regional and timing effects providing no indication of why 
transaction taxes do not always improve market stability.  
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Table 3: Inconsistent and Inconclusive Empirical Results – Transaction Taxes and the Impact 
on Market Volatility 
 Market Period Result 
Positive Effect 
Jones & Seguin (1997)221 Commissions on 
transaction taxes in the 
United States 
1975 Reduction in commission 
portion of transaction 
costs led to decrease in 
volatility and increase in 
volume 
Baltagi, Li & Li (2006)222 Impact of stamp tax 
rate increase in two 
stock markets in China 
1997 Increase in stamp tax 
caused increase in 
volatility and volume 
Pomeranets & Weaver 
(2011)223 
Reviewed nine 
changes in level of 
stamp duty in state of 
New York  
1932 - 1981 Increase in stamp duty led 
to increase in volatility, 
bid-ask spreads, price 
impact; volume decreased 
Green, Maggioni, Murinde 
(2000)224 
Impact of transaction 
costs of London Stock 
Exchange 
1870 – 1986 Increase in transaction 
costs generally increase 
market volatility 
Hau (2006)225 Review of the impact 
of transaction costs on 
selection of stocks on 
Paris bourse. 
1995 – 1998  Analysis of high 
transaction costs show 
that transaction taxes can 
increase volatility. 
Inverse affect 
Bond, Hawkins & Klemm 
(2005)226 
Effect of reduction of 
stamp duty in United 
Kingdom 
1984, 1986, 1990 Reduction in stamp duty 
had a significant and 
positive effect on price of 
more frequently traded 
shares 
Liu & Zhu (2009)227 Commission 
deregulation in Tokyo 
April 1998 – April 
1999 
Reduction in commission 
rates resulted in increase 
in volatility 
Becchetti, Ferrari, & Trenta 
(2014)228 
Introduction of French 
Tobin Tax 
90 days trading 
before and after 1 
August 2012 
Introduction of FTT 
reduces volatility 
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Neutral / No Significant Effect 
Saporta & Kan (1997)229 Changes in UK stamp 
duty 
1963 – 1996 No effect on volatility 
Roll (1989)230 Stock returns of 23 
countries 
01/02/1987 – 
10/09/1987 
Inverse relationship 
insignificantly correlated 
with volatility 
Lindgren (1994)231  Review of 11 years of 
quarterly data of 14 
stock markets in 
different countries 
11 years No effect, positive or 
negative (clustering by 
size; high tax rates 
increase volatility) 
Hu (1998)232 14 changes in 
transaction taxes in 
four markets: Hong 
Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan 
1975 - 1994 No evidence of change in 
volatility 
Sahu (2008)233 
 
Securities transaction 
tax in India 
2004 (+/- two 
years) 
No evidence of change in 
volatility and does not 
distort liquidity 
Umlauf (1993)   
  
Transaction tax on 
brokerage service 
providers in Swedish 
1980 - 1987 Increase in transaction 
taxes did not cause 
volatility to decline. 
Mixed Result s 
      Phylaktis & Aristidou (2007)234 Effect of transaction 
tax of 0.3% on Greek 
Stock Market 
24/9/1997 – 
31/12/2003 
Increased volatility during 
bull periods, and 
decreased volatility 
during bear periods 
 
If policy makers are correct, and the Proposal does achieve its objective, a reduction in 
speculation may not necessarily be beneficial for participating Member States. The volume of 
financial transaction around the world have increased dramatically in recent years. In 2007, 
trade in financial instruments accounted for 70% of world GDP.235 It is clear that any effort to 
reduce speculative trading will affect the marketability of shares236 and reduce trading 
volumes.237 What is uncertain is the extent to which volumes will be reduced. Any change in 
trading volumes will consequently affect liquidity.238,239 This is an important issue and may be 
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difficult to balance with changes in market behaviour.240 A reduction in liquidity also imposes 
a challenge for companies seeking to raise capital.241 It may have a totally different impact if 
market conditions are right – an increase in price impacts may actually cause an inverse 
reaction.242 But in general this has not been the case and the introduction of transaction taxes 
has generally lead to a reduction in market volumes, with a greater effect noted in markets 
where higher volatility and noise traders243 exist.  
Campbell & Froot244 state that the impact on volume (and hence liquidity) is ‘sensitive’ 
to the way in which the tax is implemented, but its effect is reduced if market makers can 
produce enough liquidity in the market to compensate for this.245 Further analysis of empirical 
results, focusing on the framework of the transaction tax being studied, could improve our 
understanding of how markets react.246 This includes not only looking at how the tax was 
implemented but also looking at the underlying objectives of the transaction tax being studied. 
Whilst transaction taxes inspired by Keynes and Tobin focus on market stability,247,248 revenue 
generation has been the main priority in many other transaction taxes.249 This may make 
comparison difficult in some respects, even if the Proposal creates a new revenue stream for 
the European Union.250 
Another issue that needs to be addressed here is that FTT is not specific in its objective 
to target speculative trading. As a result, financial instruments used in everyday operations will 
also be affected given also the limited scope of exemptions available under the Proposal.251 
This will mean that derivatives which are used for hedging against business risk are still subject 
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to FTT even though they have no speculative motive.252 This causes a ‘disincentive for risk 
management’253 and ‘[discourages] risk-taking by imposing positive costs on both good and 
bad realisation’.254 The impact on repo transactions, commonly used for trading, has also 
generated concern as there are few alternatives to the use of repos for collateral purposes.255 
Even if it may be difficult to make a distinction between speculative and non-speculative 
transactions,256 adoption of exemptions in line with FTT recently introduced in Italy257 
deserves further consideration as it may help to reduce the burden of FTT where transactions 
are unlikely to have a speculative motive. 
 
2.3. Compliance Considerations 
 
2.3.1. Cash Flow Considerations 
Under conditions of uncertainty the additional cost of FTT on trading could, in some 
cases, significantly outweigh the potential benefits. Features of FTT particularly make this tax 
design burdensome on the cash flow management of companies. Key to this is that FTT is 
charged in all cases, with very limited exemptions and no deductions at all against the taxable 
amount due. Not all transactions undertaken are profitable, but FTT is charged nonetheless. 
The issue of profitability is not generally considered in indirect taxes, but unlike many other 
indirect taxes where deductions are allowed for inputs, such as in the case of VAT, FTT does 
not permit any deductions whatsoever. Furthermore, FTT is even charged when transactions 
are cancelled and no exchange of financial instruments takes place.258 The latter may have a 
significant impact on cash balances if the underlying value of the cancelled transaction is 
significant. The lack of consideration for trading losses also increases the burden of FTT, but 
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such considerations are generally only a feature of direct taxes. As already outlined above, it 
may also necessitate the restructuring of groups located in the enhanced cooperation zone, 
especially EU-based companies providing treasury services.259 The cash flow burden may also 
differ across Member States if Member States choose to implement tax rates which differ to 
minimum rates established by the Proposal.  
Additionally, the notional basis of taxation for derivative instruments makes FTT 
particularly burdensome for companies. The use of notional values seeks to reduce compliance 
and administration costs,260 but would also significantly increase the tax base of derivative 
instruments subject to FTT. Where realisation has not taken place, a lack of internal funds will 
require companies to seek third-party financing. This would be the case for all instruments 
subject to FTT, but the impact may be greater for derivatives given the significant notional 
value of such instruments. Furthermore, financing may not readily be available, or only 
available at a premium. The lower tax rate on derivative instruments does little to mitigate this 
drawback, other than creating an investment bias.261 Erratic cash flow requirements also create 
difficulties for financial planning that has repercussions for the company as a whole. A change 
from a notional tax base to a cash (based on settlement date), accrual (date of transaction, 
transfer or contract date) or hybrid basis of taxation262 would improve cash flow management. 
Application of burification principles would also help to reduce the cash flow burden by giving 
due consideration to exempt underlying instruments.263 Other taxes that have been found to 
cause similar cash flow issues include wealth taxes which have, as a consequence, been 
progressively eliminated across Europe.264 
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2.3.2. The Proposal 
Authorities may favour transaction taxes for a number of reasons. Transaction taxes are 
generally viewed as easier to administer, and less costly to collect especially when they are 
carried out electronically.265 In the latter case, FTT also provides real time revenue flows to 
authorities.266 In addition, the broad scope of the tax would make it less susceptible to tax 
avoidance, making FTT technically ‘feasible’ and ‘timely’.267 But a number of compliance and 
administration issues make implementation of the current Proposal difficult. This includes a 
tax base which is not clearly defined,268 whilst no definition at all exists on how entities 
operating with the enhanced cooperation zone will be considered as forming part of a group or 
whether for that matter how those located outside the zone will also be treated.269 Further 
difficulties may arise because FTT is not linked to the transfer of legal ownership of financial 
instruments.270 The Proposal has also not taken into consideration joint ownership of financial 
instruments, nor how neutrality is safeguarded when differences in legal characteristics arise 
in different Member States. This may lead to conflicts in treatment across Member States. 
 The use of notional values also poses a problem for implementation of the Proposal. 
Despite the fact that the Proposal does define notional values,271 financial instruments are often 
quite complex and it may be difficult in practice to apply this definition. A case in point is the 
valuation of derivative products for which underlying values are not available at the moment 
when a transaction is subject to liability. Given the short time frame in which payment is to be 
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made, especially in the case of electronic transfers, this may pose practical problems for 
financial institutions. Notional values may also differ considerably from actual consideration 
paid.272,273  
Necessity, the mother of all inventions, is equally applicable within the sphere of tax 
planning, and hence we will also see new instruments placed on the market by financial 
engineers. The use of factoring in derivative instruments will consciously increase given the 
lack of anti-avoidance provisions in this respect, although the ‘robustness of the tax’ has 
already been reviewed.274 Swaps are particularly suited for factoring given that they lack any 
principle values.275 The principle of ‘substance over form’ should apply to minimise evasion 
and avoidance,276 but here too the sector can be very creative. 
Technical problems may also hamper implementation. Concern have been raised 
regarding who will be responsible for tax payments in the case of custodian services and 
whether compliance requirements will also be imposed on them.277 Clear guidelines has not 
yet been published by the Commission, making implementation difficult. Also the distinction 
between transactions which fall within the scope of the Proposal and those that are exempt, is 
not always clear. Although the Proposal seeks to comply with the Capital Duties Directive, 
there are instances where the application of the latter has given rise to confusion. In 
Commission v. Belgium278 the issue of shares was shown to include also delivery of those 
securities to subscribers, and applies similarly to bearer securities. As a result, Belgium – in 
levying stock exchange taxes on such transfers – failed to abide by Council Directive 
69/335/EEC of 17 July 1969, which bars Member States from levying indirect taxes on the 
raising of capital. In the UK, an incorrect interpretation by HMRC resulted in claims for refunds 
of stamp duty reserve tax (SDRT) after HMRC was found to have wrongly imposed SDRT on 
the issuance of shares into clearance services. In HSBC Holdings Ltd and Vidacos Nominees 
v. The Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs,279 the payment was considered to amount 
to a tax on capital and could not be justified.  
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The complexity and innovative nature of the financial sector and the diverse range of 
instruments that exist may further add to implementation problems, especially where tax 
authorities lack sufficient staff and administrative technical support. As Braithwaite and 
Wenzel280 highlight, ‘systems, no matter how elegant, rely on people to work, and if the 
assumptions made about people, either those who work as tax collectors or those who pay 
taxes, are incorrect, there is no reason for expecting that tax design by the gold standards will 
achieve the desired outcomes’.  
 
2.4.2. Arguments in Favour of Standard Implementation Procedures 
Member States will be made responsible for all administrative, accounting and 
reporting obligations281 under FTT. Harmonization in the form of standardized practices could 
prove beneficial in this case. The Commission does recommend that Member States should 
take advantage of existing and forthcoming EU legislation on financial markets282 but this 
provides little support for financial institutions in third countries who may have little 
knowledge of such legislation. Furthermore, participating Member States may have differing 
interpretations on best practices. Cross border transactions may prove cumbersome if no 
harmonised approach to implementation is affected. Issues such as how transactions in foreign 
currencies are to be treated can create inconsistencies. Even IT system that facilitate the 
administration, monitoring and coordination283 of FTT differ in the way in which they can 
support tax payment, and there is still no established reporting system for the exchange of 
information regarding counterparty transactions with financial institutions located in third 
countries. Transactions carried out off exchanges are even more difficult to monitor. Non-
participating Member States and third countries could also benefit from the introduction of 
standard practices as they will need to support financial institutions located within their 
jurisdiction who must comply with FTT. If the Proposal is to be implemented in a matter of 
months, the Commission should provide further guidance in this regard. If FTT is to be 
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introduced in the beginning of 2017, there may be little time left for discussion and agreement 
by all parties. Presently there is no clear outline on how Proposal will be introduced. Even the 
best method on how FTT should be actually collected is still being discussed.284 
 
2.4.3. Accounting and Audit Considerations 
During the financial crisis the role of the accounting profession was questioned.285 The 
widely held conclusion is that standards (fair value accounting) were unlikely to have 
contributed to the financial crisis.286 However, a recurring theme during the debate on the role 
that the profession played during the crisis was the ‘inconsistent implementation and 
subsequent misapplication of the standards by originators, securitizers, and investors’.287 If 
FTT encourage new innovative financial products, than this will only add to the problem of 
less than perfect application of standards. 
The future role of accounting standards, and the profession itself, has now been 
questioned. International standards may not be able to support innovative financial products 
that may develop in response to FTT. If accounting standards do change, the increase in 
complexity that we may observe may not necessarily add value to accounting statements.288 
The lengthy standard-making process further complicates matters. IFRS 9,289 issued in 
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response to the need to update standards pertaining to financial instruments, may require further 
review if the Proposal is implemented. Future reform in the financial sector may also require 
accountants, and auditors, to take a more proactive role in supporting a more stable financial 
sector.290 
 
3. How can the Proposal be Improved? 
History has shown that corrective taxation should be undertaken cautiously as both the 
side-effects and deadweight losses could outweigh any benefits gained.291 Claessens & Kodres, 
note that ‘any financial system reform undertaken by policy makers, including new financial 
transaction tax, must take into consideration the financial system as a whole’.292 Selected tax 
instruments must also be efficient and have the least effect on market behaviour.293 
The Proposal primarily aims to ‘right a wrong’ but empirical research show that 
transaction taxes have a wider impact than the objectives outlined by the Commission. The 
Proposal once implemented will have an effect on market behaviour,294 both before 
implementation295 and on the actual day it is introduced. Changes in market behaviour may not 
necessarily be a bad thing as it would be contradictory to the objectives of the Proposal if FTT 
did not influence trading behaviour. But it does far more than discourage inefficient trading 
and reduce market volatility. Table 4 compares the objectives as outlined by the Proposal and 
the potential unintentional consequences that may arise if the Proposal is implemented. The 
latter is based on the literature reviewed in this paper. Distortion will arise with implementation 
of the Proposal, and so too will the relocation of companies from participating Member States. 
Above all the anti-speculative effect of the Proposal, is as yet, uncertain. In addition, 
implementation of the Proposal would give rise to higher trading costs, increase redundancies 
and dampen market liquidity which may all contribute to reducing the international 
competitiveness of companies operating in the enhanced cooperation zone.  
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Table 4 – Proposed Directive: Intended Results vs. Unintended Results 
Intended Outcomes296 Unintended Potential Consequences 
1.a. Harmonization ensuring proper functioning 
of internal market and 
1.b. Avoiding distortion of competition 
 
1.a. Semi-harmonization through enhanced cooperation 
1.b. Distortion arising for enhanced cooperation zone 
based companies compared to non-FTT competitors 
2.a. Causing financial institutions to make a fair 
substantial contribution and 
2.b. Creating level playing field 
 
2.a. Relocation of business 
2.b. See 1.a and 1.b. above  
3.a. Providing appropriate disincentives for 
transactions that do not enhance efficiency 
3.b. Avoiding future crisis 
3.a. Transaction tax as anti-speculative instrument has 
provided mixed results (see section 2.2.4.) 
3.b. In addition to 2.a., revenue generation may not meet 
expectations. As a result, sufficient funds would not 
be available to meet future demands on government 
to counteract any negative pressures. 
 
 
The IMF did not hold a favourable view of the Proposal297 and noted that it may not be 
the most appropriate way forward.298 Although the debate makes us question if there are better 
alternatives to FTT,299 it is unlikely that the Commission will now change its position on 
adopting the Proposal. In this situation we must work within the framework of the existing 
Proposal and implement changes which could help foster outcomes that are more in-line with 
the intended objectives of the Proposal and that would encourage greater adoption across the 
board. Present discussions have focused on reviewing the scope of the Proposal and reassessing 
which instrument should be subject to FTT. In addition, there is growing emphasis that there 
needs to be a change to residence and issuance principles incorporated within the Proposal.300 
This would reduce the extraterritorial effect of the Proposal and help to counteract any 
distortive effect that may arise. If changes to the Proposal are to be made, the Commission 
would do well to consider revamping the Proposal on a number of other key issues as well. It 
must also place greater emphasis on providing clearer guidance on specific areas to companies 
that will be affected by the Proposal. It is obvious that there are many aspects to consider, and 
there are many and divergent views on the way forward, but in light of the discussion above, 
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the following issues should also be considered:  
a. The establishment of coordination authority providing standardised reporting, 
accounting and collection support and guidance for participating and non-
participating Member States, as well as third countries that must ensure 
enforcement at national level, 
b. Guidance notes on key principles such as definition of groups and taxable event,  
c. The adoption of intra-group exemptions301 on non-speculative trades undertaken 
between entities in a group, whist incorporating at the same time provisions which 
reverse the benefits of exemptions when subsequent transfers are made outside of 
the group after a minimum holding period is applied,  
d. Greater specificity within the Proposal that places emphasis on high-frequency 
trading and highly leveraged transactions, 
e. Ring-fencing provisions for genuine business risk hedging, by increasing the scope 
of exempt transactions to include bone fide business risk hedging, which is required 
for general trading, 
f. Excluding non-executed transactions from the scope of the Proposal, whilst 
incorporating specific provisions to safeguard against manipulative trading 
behaviour, 
g. Reassessment of the use of notional values for derivative instruments, particularly 
in the case of non-realisation, 
h. Consideration of burification provisions for exempt underlying trades, 
i. Change in the timing of the taxable event, with due consideration of realisation 
based on consideration for cash, accruals or hybrid basis for taxation, 
j. Limiting the extraterritorial effect of FTT to safeguard foreign direct investment 
from third countries, implementing at the same time beneficial ownership 
provisions to safeguard against abuse. 
 
From the alternatives presented in Section 1.3. and the points a. to j. raised above, the 
merits of VAT deserve further reconsideration. Without adopting a fully-fledged VAT system 
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for the taxation of financial instruments, the EU VAT system offers an existing framework for 
implementation of FTT and incorporates a number of administrative and compliance 
procedures that could add value to the current Proposal.  
One of the most difficult challenges of the Proposal is implementation of the Proposal 
itself. Both the cost and technical difficulties that companies will face discourages adoption 
and encourages relocation of activities. VAT provides an existing framework for 
implementation which could help to develop a parallel administration system for FTT or 
provide a platform in itself to facilitate compliance and administration as well as coordination 
between Member States. It would also provide benefits for third countries which already have 
experience in dealing with VAT when undertaking transactions with companies in the 
European Union. In short, FTT could use the same reporting framework available for VAT, 
including registration of financial institutions, which could compliment, or replace, the current 
system of identification of financial services.302 VAT also provides for the submission of 
returns, with payment, periodically allowing for an extended period between realisation and 
payment which would reduce the cash flow burden on companies and allow greater opportunity 
for the realisation of financial instruments to take place. The system of registration under VAT 
which is supported by the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES) would greatly facilitate 
the identification of counterparties and reduce the risk of joint and several liability by 
confirming that counterparties are in fact registered for payment of FTT. The same registration 
system could be used, or alternatively a new one developed along the same framework. The 
use of recap statements framework which is a compliance requirement under VAT could also 
help participating Member States overcome some practical difficulties in identifying and 
assessing counterparties and furthermore allows reconciliation by authorities in different 
Member States to take place in a standardised way. This would greatly facilitate the auditing 
of cross border transactions and ensure that the basis for valuation between different countries 
is the same. VAT also incorporates group ring-fencing provisions,303 with established criteria 
for the identification of groups and reporting requirements. The use of VAT principles here 
would facilitate the development of guidelines on exemption basis for intra-group transfers 
undertaken within the scope of the Proposal without having to develop a new system for 
guidance or interpretation. Reverting to a fully-fledged VAT system that taxes the financial 
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sector may not be the way forward, but that does not mean that the advantages that are offered 
by this tax instrument should be completely ignored.   
 
4. Conclusions and Outlook 
The Proposal has to date remained just that, a Proposal. Recent setbacks shed light on 
pressure to refine the Proposal and make it more acceptable to those who must implement it. 
Non-participating Member States in particular have voiced their concern regarding the 
extraterritorial effect of the Proposal and recent comments by the European Council Legal 
Service sheds doubt on the application of FTT as it currently stands. Although the Commission 
did not agree with the conclusion of the Council, the overwhelming evidence shows that as the 
Proposal needs to be reassessed not only to address the potential unintentional impacts that 
may arise as a consequence of the Proposal, but also to ensure that greater adoption is achieved 
by those States who have currently opted out of the enhanced cooperation agreement.  
Greater harmonisation would remove many of the potential negative consequences on 
competition for companies located within the enhanced cooperation zone. Widespread 
adoption will only take place if the Commission is willing to reassess its position and adopt a 
more flexible approach to taxing financial transactions across Europe. This includes a 
reassessment of the scope and tax base and many other aspects which have already been 
mentioned above, while keeping the possible effect on the competitiveness of companies in 
mind. The seeds of change may however have already been planted. Algirdas Šemeta, the 
European Union's Taxation Commissioner has been quoted as saying that ‘we would support 
a compromise with a more limited remit [...] the only red line for us is that any loopholes which 
would jeopardise the main principle of the tax be avoided’.304 Such flexibility from the Proposal 
as it currently stands may mean that it would be embraced by other Member States and with 
greater adoption also comes a reduction in the distortive effect of FTT. The Commission may 
need to find its own spoon full of sugar to make FTT more palatable to all concerned.    
Although the wide basis of taxation found within the Proposal encourages neutrality, it 
cannot compensate for the lack of harmonisation of transaction taxes. Given the mobile nature 
of trading, neutrality is far from certain. The Commission must be willing to monitor closely 
the real effects of the tax. Support must be provided to the business community by authorities 
located both in participating and non-participating Member States.  
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If FTT is to be introduced by the beginning of 2017, the biggest question that now 
remains is how the Proposal is going to be implemented across companies operating in different 
jurisdictions. Previous alternative means to tax the financial services sector can provide 
inspiration for revamping the Proposal. The framework for implementation of VAT could 
provide added value to the Proposal and stream line processes for smoother implementation. It 
could also help to clarify a number of key issues such as providing a definition for group 
structures, and a framework for counterparty confirmation. The complexity and uncertainty 
that currently overshadows the Proposal is far too great for the Commission not to take a stand. 
Notwithstanding that this paper has focused on the business perspective of the Proposal, 
the initial considerations of why FTT was first discussed should not be overlooked. Following 
the polluters pay principle, the tax seeks to overcome some of the drawbacks that the market 
cannot compensate for. A transaction tax may be the only way to reduce excess speculation. 
Even if not proven in all cases, it does ensure that those who have contributed to the crisis pay, 
in some way, for the damages they have caused. Through its broad nature and the principle of 
extraterritoriality, the Proposal also ensures that companies that should pay, do, as there are 
very few opportunities to avoid the tax, if at all. FTT may not be entirely beneficial from a 
business perspective but may still have an important social role to play in regulating the market.  
It may be a necessary constraint required by a market which has been found unable to restrain 
itself.  
The impact of this innovative tax and whether or not it will be able to address the 
underlying objectives it purports to achieve has yet to be seen. If it misses its target it may 
cause more harm than good. Although the past is no guarantee of the future, history does have 
a habit of repeating itself. Can Europe weather another economic storm if it misses its mark?   
